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NOTES
ALL'S FAIR: NO REMEDY UNDER TITLE III FOR
INTERSPOUSAL SURVEILLANCE
INTRODUCTION
The domestic relations doctrine' embodies the concept that domestic
relations is governed by state law to the exclusion of federal law.' Conse-
quently, divorce, child custody proceedings and other domestic disputes
are adjudicated under state, not federal law.3
Domestic disputes involving non-consensual interspousal surveillance,
however, implicate areas of both state and federal law.4 Interspousal sur-
veillance typically occurs when an individual records telephone conversa-
tions of his spouse without the spouse's knowledge or consent, often in an
attempt to gain evidence for use in a divorce or child custody proceeding.
The spouses may be living together or separately, and the surveillance
may be performed by the spouse personally or by a third party at the
request of the spouse.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(the "Act") prohibits the non-consensual interception of wire, oral or
electronic communications of another5 by any person. 6 The federal stat-
ute provides both criminal punishment for violators and civil remedies to
victims.7 Courts have struggled with the question of whether the federal
statute should apply to interspousal surveillance.8 While the language of
Title III suggests a blanket prohibition of any non-consensual surveil-
lance,9 the application of the federal statute to interspousal surveillance
would intrude upon the historical role of the state as the governing body
of family law and the sole arbiter of domestic disputes.10
1. The domestic relations doctrine was first outlined in In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1890); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858). In response to a
child custody suit brought in federal court, the Supreme Court declined to permit federal
jurisdiction because "[tihe whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States." In re Burrus 136 U.S. at 593-4. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
2. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94.
3. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
4. Hearings on Invasions of Privacy, Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Pro-
cedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, 2261 (1966).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
6. See id.
7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(4)(5), 2520 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
8. Four prominent cases exemplify the division of authority between the circuits.
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977), and Simpson v. Simpson, 490
F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974), hold that Title III does not apply to
interspousal surveillance. On the other hand, Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th
Cir. 1984) and United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976), favor the application
of the statute to interspousal surveillance.
9. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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This Note examines whether Title III of the Act should apply to inter-
spousal surveillance. Part I discusses the plain meaning of Title III and
explains the need to look to legislative history when determining congres-
sional intent. Part II analyzes the meaning of the statute in light of its
legislative history. Part III discusses the states' exclusive role in the area
of family law. This Note concludes that Title III should not provide a
federal remedy for interspousal surveillance.
I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
On its face," Title III prohibits non-consensual surveillance by any
"person" who attempts to intercept the wire, oral, or electronic commu-
nication of another,1 2 unless specifically excepted from the statute.13 The
statute appears to encompass almost any type of non-consensual inter-
ception, including interspousal surveillance. The word "person" is not a
term of art; it is undefined in the statute and appears to have its ordinary
meaning. The statute's language defining both the type of surveillance
prohibited and the plaintiff and defendant class is inclusive in nature.
This broad language has persuaded many courts to find that Title III
applies to interspousal surveillance.14
Despite Title III's inclusive language, Congress exempted certain sur-
11. In order to determine whether Title III of the Act applies to interspousal surveil-
lance, courts must interpret the meaning of the statute. When construing a statute,
courts first look to its plain meaning. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 2.2, at 75-
76 (2d ed. 1986). The plain meaning rule dictates that, "'[w]here the language [of a
statute] is plain and admits of no more than one meaning[,] the duty of interpretation
does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.'"
Id. at 76 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). This form of
statutory interpretation is limited to the plain language of the statute and dispenses with
the use of outside materials such as legislative history. Id.
12. Title III provides:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who-
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other per-
son to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communi-
cation;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use
or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any
oral communication when-
(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire,
cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; ... shall be pun-
ished ... or shall be subject to suit.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a),(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
14. See Kempf v. Kempf, No. 88-1257, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Feb. 21, 1989) ("[tjhe
remedy clearly applies to any 'person' defined as 'any individual' "); United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 666 (6th Cir. 1976). The statute's language was interpreted as "'ef-
fectively ... prohibit[ing] ... all interceptions of wire and oral communications, except
those specifically provided for in the Act.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416
U.S. 505, 514 (1974)); see also Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984)
(statute prohibits all wiretapping unless specifically excepted); Heyman v. Heyman, 548
F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same); Gill v. Willer, 482 F. Supp. 776, 778
(W.D.N.Y. 1980) (same).
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veillance from criminal and civil liability. For example, Section 2511(2)
exempts switchboard operators and employees of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission from prosecution and civil liability, provided they
are acting within the scope of their employment. 15 The statute also pro-
vides an exception for interception via an extension telephone. 6 Neither
the outlined exceptions in section 2511(2) nor the telephone extension
exception specifically exempts or even addresses interspousal
surveillance.
Some courts assert that the delineation of exceptions within the statute
demonstrates the legislators' careful consideration of what circumstances
the statute should cover.' 7 Had Congress intended the statute not to ap-
ply to interspousal surveillance, Congress would have included a specific
exception to that effect.1
8
Similarly, some proponents of a broad interpretation of the statute ar-
gue that the specificity of language concerning criminal penalties and
civil remedies in the statute mandate the application of Title III to inter-
spousal surveillance.' 9 The statute clearly outlines the criminal and civil
consequences of non-consensual surveillance. If prosecuted, the errant
eavesdropper may be fined and imprisoned up to five years for his of-
15. The following individuals and circumstances are exempt from the statute:
(1) switchboard operators and employees of providers of wire or electronic
communication service "in the normal course of their employment," 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and to provide assistance to persons author-
ized by law,
(2) employees of the Federal Communications Commission,
(3) a person acting under color of law,
(4) consented interception, and
(5) government foreign intelligence activities.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
16. The statute prohibits unpermitted surveillance through the use of any "electronic,
mechanical, or other device" except an extension telephone used in the ordinary course of
the user's business. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). "Electronic,
mechanical, or other device" is defined as:
any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or elec-
tronic communication other than-
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any com-
ponent thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business and be-
ing used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or fur-
nished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service
and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider
of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its busi-
ness, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of
his duties.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
17. See Jones, 542 F.2d at 671; Heyman, 548 F. Supp. at 1045; Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F.
Supp. 463, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
18. See Jones, 542 F. Supp. at 671; Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 467; Remington, 393 F.
Supp. at 901.
19. See Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 373 (4th Cir. 1984); Heyman v. Hey-
man, 548 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
1038 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
fense.2° In a civil case, the relief provided may be a preliminary or
mandatory injunction against future surveillance and actual and punitive
damages.2 The eavesdropper in a civil case faces minimum damages of
$10,000 with possible punitive damages and attorney's fees.2 z
The statutory provision for a civil remedy for non-consensual elec-
tronic surveillance indicates that the statute was designed to prohibit spe-
cific types of surveillance activity between private parties. Several courts
that apply a plain meaning interpretation to the statute conclude that
Title III applies to interspousal surveillance because of this provision for
a civil remedy.23 The availability of a civil remedy, however, does not
mandate application of Title III to surveillance activity between a hus-
band and wife.
Regardless of the clarity of the language, a court may consult legisla-
tive history to discover congressional intent regarding the meaning and
application of the statute.24 When the literal reading of a statute conflicts
with a "clear contrary evidence of legislative intent,"25 the legislative in-
tent will govern the interpretation of the statute.
Ambiguity in a statute also justifies the use of legislative history when
construing a statute.26 Courts exercise a great deal of discretion in deter-
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) provides:
(b) Relief.
In an action under this section, appropriate relief includes-
(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be
appropriate;
(2) damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate
cases; and
(3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred.
22. Damages are computed as follows:
[T]he court may assess as damages whichever is the greater of-
(A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits
made by the violator as a result of the violation; or
(B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each
day of violation or $10,000.
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
23. See Pritchard, 732 F.2d at 374; Heyman, 548 F. Supp. at 1045; Gill v. Wilier, 482
F. Supp. 776, 778 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
24. A court need not restrict its analysis to the language of the statute but rather may
"use available aids to construction no matter how clear the statute may appear at first
inspection." Brigham v. United States, 539 F.2d 1312, 1316 n.8 (3d Cir. 1976); see United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) ("When aid to contruc-
tion of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no
'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial
examination.' ") (footnotes omitted). A court is permitted to look beyond the language of
the statute in determining its meaning and application. See id.
25. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974).
26. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 12, § 2.2(d), at 78 (legislative history may
resolve ambiguity in interpreting statutes).
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mining whether a statute is ambiguous. 27 For example, in deciding
whether to apply an unclear criminal statute to a given situation, courts
will often determine that the statute is ambiguous in that context. 28
When a court finds that a statute is ambiguous, the court looks to the
legislative history to discover congressional intent.2 9
Although the language of Title III appears clear,3° some courts have
found the statute to be ambiguous on the specific issue of interspousal
surveillance.31 Because the domestic relations doctrine32 suggests the
possible prohibition of interspousal surveillance is an issue to be resolved
under state law, Title III should not be applied in this factual context.33
Such an application would lead to an unusual result-a federal remedy
for a domestic dispute.34 Thus, it is necessary to examine the legislative
history of the statute.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of Title III offers conflicting evidence on
whether the statute should apply to interspousal surveillance. While por-
tions of the legislative history suggest a broad prohibition of non-consen-
sual surveillance, the legislative purpose indicates that the statute was
enacted more particularly to combat crime.
A. Major Purpose of the Act-Crime Control
As stated in the Senate report accompanying the legislation, the pri-
mary goal of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968




30. See Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984); Heyman v. Hey-
man, 548 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Gill v. Wilier, 482 F. Supp. 776, 778
(W.D.N.Y. 1980).
31. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974). The court stated that while "[tihe naked language... reaches this case... we
are of the opinion that Congress did not intend such a far reaching result.... ." After an
extensive study of the statute's legislative history, the court concluded that Congress did
not demonstrate a "positive intent" or even an "awareness" that they would be prohibit-
ing interspousal surveillance. See id.; see also Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529, 533
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Absent a signal, either in the statute itself or in the legislative history,
that Congress intended that the Act's criminal and civil proscriptions and liabilities ex-
tend to [interspousal surveillance within the home], this Court must decline to impute
such an intent.")
32. See supra note 1.
33. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson, 490 F.2d
at 805-06; Lizza, 631 F. Supp. at 532.
34. See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 805. The Simpson court stated that Title III's applica-
tion to interspousal surveillance would "[extend] into areas normally left to the states,
those of the marital home and domestic conflicts." Id. While the court noted that Con-
gress did have the authority to regulate electronic surveillance, a "federal remedy for
parties aggrieved by the personal acts of their spouses" would be a "novelty." Id. at 805
& n.6, 806.
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crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of law en-
forcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of government." 31 In
its discussion of the statute, the report stated, "[t]he major purpose of
title III is to combat organized crime."36 Title III is designed to provide
general protection for the privacy of wire and oral communications while
"delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under
which the interception of wire and oral communications may be author-
ized."37 The specific guidelines contained in Title III were designed to
remove the confusion in the law governing surveillance by law enforce-
ment officials.38
Congress intended Title III to provide wiretapping and electronic sur-
veillance methods to supplement law enforcement efforts against organ-
ized crime.39 Four sections are devoted to outlining proper procedures,
authorization and reporting requirements for the interception and disclo-
sure of communications. 40
35. This statement of legislative purpose introduced the Senate report which accom-
panied House Report 5037 (the predecessor to the Act). See S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2112, 2112.
36. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2157.
37. Id. at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2153. The Senate
Report also notes explicit exceptions for the President of the United States in the interest
of national security and employees of both the Federal Communications Commission and
communications common carriers in the normal course of their employment. Id. at 66-
67, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2153-54.
38. The report noted that "[b]oth proponents and opponents of wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance agree that the present state of the law [pertaining to electronic surveil-
lance by law enforcement officials] is extremely unsatisfactory and that the Congress
should act to clarify the resulting confusion." Id. at 67, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News at 2154; see Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 418
(5th Cir. 1980); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
897 (1974).
39. See generally S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 186-88, reprinted in 1968
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2112, 2245-46 (Sen. Birch Bayh discussed Title III as a
tool to combat organized crime); id. at 209-19, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 2259-68 (Sen. Hugh Scott indicated that the legislation demonstrated an
intent to mount an effective fight against organized crime); id. at 224-39, reprinted in 1968
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2273-88 (Sens. Everett McKinley Dirksen, Roman
L. Hruska, Hugh Scott, and Strom Thurmond found Title III a major contribution to
organized crime fighting efforts).
40. The four sections enacted primarily for the use of law enforcement officials are
entitled as follows:
"Authorization for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications," 18
U.S.C. § 2516 (Supp. V 1987), "Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire,
oral, or electronic communications," 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (Supp. V 1987), "Procedure for
interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications," 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. V
1987), and "Reports concerning intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communications."
18 U.S.C. § 2519 (Supp. V 1987).
The remaining sections pertain to statutory definitions, see 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Supp. V
1987), a description of the prohibited interceptions, see 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Supp. V 1987),
prohibition of the manufacture, distribution, possession and advertising of intercepting
devices prohibited, see 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (Supp. V 1987), confiscation of intercepting de-
vices, see 18 U.S.C. § 2513 (Supp. V 1987), and civil damages, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. V
1987).
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A statute's purpose helps to define the statute's applicable scope. Be-
cause Title III was enacted primarily to control crime and outline proce-
dures for surveillance by law enforcement officials, the application of the
statute to interspousal surveillance would be an inappropriate extension
of the statute beyond its intended scope.41
B. Rule of Construction: Construing a Criminal Statute Favorably
Toward the Defendant
Certain statutes with civil characteristics nevertheless may be properly
classified as criminal.42 Statutes imposing fines for certain conduct fall
within this category.43 The statutory penalty may be recovered by the
state, an informer, or, as in the case of Title III, an injured party. 44 Stat-
utes with these and other similar provisions have been held to be criminal
or quasi-criminal.45
Title III is properly classified as a criminal statute.4 6 It was enacted
primarily to combat crime,47 and the statute provides criminal penalties
for prohibited surveillance.4" Additionally, the statute imposes a fine for
the prohibited behavior to be recouped by the injured party.49 The fact
that the penalty is couched in civil terms does not change the criminal
nature of the statute.
Criminal statutes must be construed in favor of the defendant5° for two
41. See Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851, 855-56 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Lizza v. Lizza, 631
F. Supp. 529, 532-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
42. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 12, § 2.2(d), at 77-78 & n.23 (penal statutes
"may include some statutes which might properly be called civil... [such as] a statute
providing for a money penalty for certain conduct")
43. See id. at 78.
44. See id. § 1.7, at 42.
45. For a discussion of various tests used in determining whether a statute is criminal,
see Comment, Statutory Penalties-A Legal Hybrid, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1092, 1096-98
(1938).
46. Courts have classified Title III as a criminal statute. In Simpson v. Simpson, 490
F.2d 803 (5th. Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974), the court noted that "not only does
Title III have the primary goal of controlling crime, but ... it also prescribes criminal
sanctions for its violators.... We are thus bound by the principle that criminal statutes
must be strictly construed to avoid ensnaring behavior that is not clearly proscribed." Id.
at 809. In Robinson v. Robinson, 499 So. 2d 152, 155 (La. Ct. App. 1986), the court
referred to Title III as "the federal criminal wiretap act" and concluded that interspousal
surveillance "does not rise to the level of criminal conduct proscribed by the federal
statute."
47. See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809; Robinson, 499 So. 2d at 155. See supra notes 35-40
and accompanying text.
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (Supp. V 1987).
50. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 12, § 2.2(d), at 77. Courts will construe a
criminal statute liberally in the defendant's favor when determining whether or not a
statute applies. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. American Broadcasting Co.,
347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954) (in holding certain F.C.C. regulations invalid, the court made
reference to "the well-established principle that penal statutes are to be construed
strictly"); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974); see also Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955) ("When Congress leaves to
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reasons. First, strict construction gives criminals notice of the prohibited
behavior and the severity of the punishment. 1 Second, the legislature,
not the courts, is empowered to determine what constitutes criminal be-
havior."2 A broad judicial interpretation of the statute may wrongly
usurp this power. Because Title III of the Act is a criminal statute, the
defendant should receive the benefit of narrow construction.
Application of this criminal rule of construction to Title III requires
courts to interpret the statute narrowly. Because of the statute's conflict-
ing legislative history53 and the presumption that domestic relations is-
sues are within the domain of state law,54 narrow construction that
operates to exclude individuals not clearly intended to be covered by the
statute would place the intercepting spouse beyond the reach of the
statute.
Similarly, another rule of construction favors a narrow interpretation.
This rule requires statutes with severe penalties to be construed more
narrowly than those with lighter penalties. 5 Because the civil eaves-
dropper faces minimum damages of $10,000 and possible punitive dam-
ages and attorney's fees under the statute,56 Title III should not be
extended to interspousal surveillance, but should be construed narrowly.
C. Private Surveillance and Civil Recovery
Despite Congress' predominant concern with crime control, the stat-
ute provides a civil remedy for non-consensual electronic surveillance as
well. 57 The availability of a private remedy indicates that the statute was
intended to prohibit non-consensual surveillance between private parties
in some cases.58
The Senate Report identified common "uses and abuses" of electronic
surveillance beyond law enforcement activities. 59 The report noted the
growing use of electronic surveillance in a business context, such as trade
secret theft and labor/management spying in employment disputes, as
the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should
be resolved in favor of lenity.").
51. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 12, § 2.2(d), at 78.
52. See id. Although a statute need not state expressly to whom it applies, it does not
necessarily apply to all but those specifically excepted. That is, an implied exception may
still exist.
53. See infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
55. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 12, § 2.2(d), at 79.
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b), (c)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b) (Supp. V 1987).
58. See Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The Rem-
ington court distinguished between surveillance actually performed by the spouse and
surveillance performed by private detectives, law firms and "other unknown persons."
Id.
59. See S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 2112, 2154.
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well as surveillance of private individuals.6" The Senate Report also re-
ferred to a broad intent behind the statute. The report described Title III
as a prohibition of "all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by per-
sons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers engaged in the
investigation or prevention of specified types of serious crimes, and only
after authorization of a court order obtained after a showing and finding
of probable cause."61 This statement has been cited to support the con-
tention that interspousal surveillance is prohibited as well.62
Although congressional discussions focused primarily upon police sur-
veillance activity and crime control, the statute's legislative history indi-
cates that Congress was aware of the use of wiretapping in domestic
disputes.63 Professor G. Robert Blakey, instrumental in the creation of
Title III, testified that two primary uses of private electronic surveillance
are commercial espionage and domestic relations investigations." In ad-
dition, Senator Edward V. Long65 identified three major uses of private
wiretapping: industrial, political, and divorce cases.66 Testimony at the
Senate hearing from private investigators67 and a district attorney6" de-
scribed the use of electronic surveillance in domestic disputes.
The reference to electronic surveillance employed in marital disputes
has convinced a number of courts that the legislators deliberately chose
not to except spying spouses from the statutory prohibition on non-con-
sensual surveillance.69 In many cases, however, courts have chosen to
apply the statute to interspousal surveillance only in limited circum-
60. See id. In noting the growing use of electronic surveillance in these contexts, the
Report refers to "tremendous scientific and technological developments" fostering so-
phisticated surveillance, suggesting that more mundane answering machines and tape re-
corders commonly used in interspousal surveillance may be beyond the scope of the
statutory prohibition. See id.
61. Id. at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2153.
62. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 668 (6th Cir. 1976).
63. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
64. See Right of Privacy Act of 1967. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac-
tice & Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 413
(1967).
65. Senator Edward V. Long was the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the Senate hear-
ings on Title III. See Hearings on Invasions of Privacy, Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Practice & Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, 2261
(1966).
66. See id.
67. Additional testimony from two private investigators, Bernard Spindel and John
W. Leon, that electronic surveillance was commonly used in domestic relations investiga-
tions. See id. at 2262 (Spindel), 2411 (Leon).
68. Richard Gerstein, District Attorney of Dade County, Florida, testified that "it is
routine procedure in marital disagreements and other civil disputes for private detective
agencies, generally with full knowledge of the lawyers, to tap telephones." Id. at 1009.
69. See, e.g., Kempf v. Kempf, No. 88-1257, slip op. at 5 (8th Cir. Feb. 21, 1989);
Nations v. Nations, 670 F. Supp. 1432, 1434-35 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Gill v. Willer, 482 F.
Supp. 776, 778 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 467-68 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
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stances,7 ° depending upon whether the surveillance was performed by a
third person and whether the couple was living together at the time of
the surveillance.7'
Some courts focus on the party conducting the surveillance.72 The
courts relying on legislative history conclude that Congress intended to
prohibit surveillance performed by a third party rather than the spouse.73
Another view is that there is no distinction between spousal and third
party surveillance;74 the focus is instead upon the communication itself.
The communication is protected regardless of the relationship of the in-
terceptor to the person communicating.75 Generally, these courts found
that interspousal surveillance constitutes a claim under the statute.7 6
Still other courts base their decisions on a second factual distinction:
the living arrangements of the married couple. Under this analysis, civil
liability for interspousal surveillance depends upon whether the spouses
share a residence. These courts treat the marital home as a surveillance
safety zone for spouses.77 They rely upon certain parts of the legislative
70. See Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851, 855-56 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (interception via the
attachment of a recording device to the telephone within the home--directed verdict for
defendant); Baumrind v. Ewing 276 S.C. 350, 353, 279 S.E.2d 359, 360, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981) (no third party surveillance involved-held no liability).
71. See Perfit, 693 F. Supp. at 855-56; Baumrind, 276 S.C. at 353, 279 S.E.2d at 360.
72. See White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 1976); Remington v. Reming-
ton, 393 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
73. See White, 535 F.2d at 1071 ("no sound rationale or legal basis in the statute or in
its legislative history to insulate a private detective from the reach of... civil penalties");
Baumrind, 276 S.C. at 353, 279 S.E.2d at 360 (wiretap by spouse and not private detec-
tive; therefore no liability).
The court in Simpson v. Simpson noted that the limited amount of legislative history on
the issue of surveillance in domestic disputes appeared to be directed at private investiga-
tors. 490 F.2d 803, 808 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). The Simpson court
expressed its view that a qualitative difference exists between a third party surveillance
and a spousal surveillance, although the court did not address whether the statute would
apply in these circumstances. The court stated that "a third-party intrusion into the
marital home, even if instigated by one spouse, is an offense against a spouse's privacy of
a much greater magnitude than is personal surveillance by the other spouse." Id. at 809.
Some courts have concluded that liability turned upon whether the intercepting party
was a spouse or a third party. The court in Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898
(E.D. Pa. 1975) stated that:
[w]hile Congress apparently did not intend to provide a Federal remedy for
persons aggrieved by the personal acts of their spouses committed within the
marital home, the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that the gross
invasion of an individual's privacy by private detective agencies, law firms and
other unknown persons, whether instigated by a spouse or not, is not included
within the statutory proscription.
Id. at 901. Accord White, 535 F.2d at 1071 (citing Remington).
74. See Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984); Kratz v. Kratz, 477
F. Supp. 463, 471-72 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
75. See Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 471.
76. See Pritchard, 732 F.2d at 374, Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 472. These courts do not
specify a rationale for their conclusions.
77. See Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851, 855 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (no liability because
"the interception took place entirely within the marital home where both parties re-
sided"); Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (neither a third party
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history which suggest the distinction between married couples living to-
gether and those living apart. 8 This distinction has not been adopted
unanimously. 79
Some evidence in the statute's legislative history indicates that the leg-
islators did not intend the statute to apply to intrafamily surveillance
regardless of the couple's living situtation. An often cited example is
testimony from Professor Herman Schwartz, who warned of the danger
of overinclusiveness that could result from the broadly worded statute."0
Professor Schwartz noted that Title III was not designed to prohibit a
father from listening to his teenage daughter's conversation on an exten-
sion telephone.81
Read literally, the statement expresses only a concern of a legislative
intrusion into an area of parental privilege. However, courts have found
this statement to be an express indication of Congress' intent not to inter-
fere in domestic situations generally.82 This statement provided a basis
for several decisions not to apply the statute to interspousal
surveillance.8 3
Proponents of the application of Title III to interspousal surveillance
argue that the marriage in these cases has deteriorated to a point where it
conversant nor a spouse has a claim under Title III because "[a] husband's wiretapping of
his own phone falls outside the purview of the Act")
78. At a meeting of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Long read from an article concerning
electronic surveillance by Arthur Whitman entitled, "Is Big Brother Taping You?" See
Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1965) (from tape
recording). The article noted that "[s]o little is sacred in (divorce actions) that bugs
routinely are discovered under the beds of estranged husbands and wives." Id. at 18.
The reference to estranged spouses suggests that legislators distinguished between spouses
living apart and those living together in the marital home. The court in Simpson v.
Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974), viewed this statement
as support for Congressional intent not to prohibit interspousal surveillance. Id. at 808
& n.14.
79. In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977), the court was not
troubled by the fact that the husband and wife were not living together at the time of the
surveillance, holding that the dispute was nevertheless a domestic one not "[rising] to the
level" of a statutory violation. Id. at 679. The relationship of the parties was crucial in
determining whether the surveillance was prohibited, not the place in which the surveil-
lance occurred. In United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 673 (6th Cir. 1976), the court
was also unconvinced by the exception to surveillance within the marital home. "Marital
home" is a term used by the courts to describe a husband and wife sharing a residence.
The court held that the statute applied to married individuals who were not living to-
gether, but indicated its disagreement with the shared residence distinction. See id.;
Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U. Tol. L. Rev. 185, 204-05
& n.85 (1975).
80. See Right of Privacy Act of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac-
tice & Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 395 (1967).
81. See id.
82. See Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 678-79; Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
83. See Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679; Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809 n.17. Contra Kratz v.
Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 474-75 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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is no longer a relationship and the spouse should therefore be treated no
differently than a third party.84 This argument fails to recognize mar-
riage as a binding legal relationship which exists regardless of the degree
of domestic tranquility between a husband and wife. The marriage cre-
ates lowered expectations of privacy between spouses which are easily
distinguished from those expectations of privacy vis-a-vis a third party."
D. The Telephone Extension Exception
The telephone extension exception provides an example of statutory
language which, in the context of its legislative history, supports the ar-
gument that the statute should not be applied to interspousal surveil-
lance.86 Two aspects of the telephone extension exception provide a
rationale for finding interspousal surveillance beyond the scope of the
statute: the "telephone" clause87and the use "by the subscriber or user in
the ordinary course of its business" clause.88
The telephone clause excepts from the statute "any telephone or tele-
graph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof...
furnished to the subscriber or user."89 Surveillance via an extension tele-
phone is therefore beyond the purview of the statute, provided it satisfies
the ordinary course of business requirement.9"
Courts in the Second and Fifth Circuits have interpreted this portion
of the telephone extension exception as a blanket exception to any non-
consensual surveillance by another family member.9" If surveillance via
an extension telephone is permitted, surveillances which occur in a simi-
lar context should also be permitted. An ordinary tape recorder or an-
swering machine, the devices most often used in interspousal
surveillance, have limited surveillance utility.92 The conversation re-
corded with the use of one of these devices is considered to be no differ-
84. See Comment, supra note 79, at 195-97 (1975).
85. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
86. See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809; Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851, 856 (C.D. Cal.
1988).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
88. Id. The term "business" in this clause does not have its common meaning. For
different interpretations among the courts, see infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
90. See id.; infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
91. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson v.
Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). But see Campiti
v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (lst Cir. 1979) (statute's application "should not turn on
the type of equipment that is used, but whether the privacy of telephone conversations
has been invaded in a manner offensive to the words and intent of the Act").
One author criticizes the use of the telephone extension exception as a basis for except-
ing interspousal surveillance from Title III. See Comment, Criminal Law-Private
Eavesdropping-Second Circuit Finds Marital Dispute Implicitly Exempted From the Fed-
eral WiretappingAct. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 27 Buffalo L. Rev. 139, 150-152 (1977).
92. These devices are commonly found in the home. Their general function is innoc-
uous, and is easily distinguished from the sophisticated surveillance technology used by
professional spies.
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ent from that which could be overheard on an extension telephone.93
Following this rationale, the court in Simpson v. Simpson found no
"convincing distinction" between the surveillance achieved by the exten-
sion telephone and that achieved by an answering machine or tape
recorder.
94
The statute provides an exception for the interception only if the tele-
phone extension is used in the ordinary course of the user's business. 95
Some courts have interpreted this clause to mean that it was necessary to
look to the purpose and extent of the defendant's interception to deter-
mine whether the surveillance was in violation of the statute.96 Other
courts have concluded that the location of the surveillance and the mari-
tal status of the parties governs the application of the statute.97
The legislative history surrounding the development of the telephone
extension exception is illuminating. A previous draft of the bill9" was
revised to include the requirement that the user must be using the exten-
sion telephone in the ordinary course of business. 99 The revision was
made partly in response to the objections of some that an extension tele-
phone could indeed be used in a manner offensive to the spirit of the
statute.1°°
93. See Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851, 856 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
94. 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). But see supra note
79, at 205 ("There are two vital distinctions between an extension phone and a wiretap as
they are used to intercept private conversations-the degree of human supervision and
the potential product."). The author argues that human weaknesses such as hunger and
sleep limit the continuity of surveillance available with the use of a recording device. See
id. at 205. In addition, the likelihood of detection inhibits the extension telephone eaves-
dropper, thus affecting the final product. Id. at 205-06.
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
96. See, e.g., Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1980)
(an employer listening to an employee's conversation during the working day for a busi-
ness purpose was not within the scope of the statute); Remington v. Remington, 393 F.
Supp. 898, 900 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (defendant spouse was liable due to the egregious nature
of the interception: constant surveillance for an extended period of time); United States
v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (in a criminal context, employer
not guilty for monitoring employee's conversations when there had been allegations of
business improprieties).
97. See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809-10; Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529, 532-33
(E.D.N.Y. 1986).
98. The previous draft read: "an extension telephone instrument furnished to the
subscriber or user by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its
business ... ." H.R. 5470, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2515(d)(1) (1967), reprinted in Hear-
ings on the Anti-Crime Program Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 892, 894 (1967).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
100. Professor Herman Schwartz commented on the possible intrusive uses of an ex-
tension telephone:
1) an eavesdropper breaks in to the home or office without anyone's knowl-
edge, and eavesdrops on an extension;
2) the police or other individual coerce a person into letting them listen in on
an extension phone;
3) the police or other individual obtain permission to listen in on an extension
phone from a person not a party to the conversation without proper authority.
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If the spousal surveillance takes place within the marital home, some
courts find that the ordinary course of business requirement is met.10'
These courts have employed the following rationale: the legislative his-
tory surrounding the development of the telephone extension exception
indicates that the ordinary course of business clause was intended to pro-
hibit intruders-not family members-from surveillance activity.'02
Family members are excluded from the statutory prohibition because of
the familial relationship between the interceptor and the intercepted
party. 10 3 Courts recognize that the act of surveillance is really an exten-
sion of a domestic dispute."4 Since interspousal surveillance is rooted in
a domestic dispute, the act occurs in the course of family activity.'05
This interpretation of the ordinary course of business clause does not
suggest that a married individual is likely to eavesdrop on his spouse as a
matter of course. Rather, the rationale is rooted in two factors: the
lower expectation of privacy between a husband and wife"0 6 and a per-
ceived congressional intent not to interfere in surveillance between family
members. 1
0 7
Within the home, family members have a diminished expectation of
See Right of Privacy Act of 1967 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice &
Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 395 (1967). Professor
Schwartz's comments illustrate the type of surveillance the legislators wanted to prohibit,
namely those surveillances performed by a non-family member who either forcibly enters
and eavesdrops or coerces someone else to do so.
101. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974). The Simpson court stated that the telephone extension exception is "indicative of
Congress['] intent to abjure from deciding a very intimate question of familial relations,
that of the extent of privacy family members may expect within the home vis-a-vis each
other." Id. In United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974), the court relied
upon the Simpson court's analysis to determine behavior which falls within the statute
because the defendant was neither married to complainant nor "a part of [complainant's]
household." Id. at 850-51; see also Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851, 855-56 (C.D. Cal.
1988), (agreeing with the Simpson analysis).
102. See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809 n.17. Professor Herman Schwartz expressed his
concern that the previous version of the telephone extension exception would permit in-
truders to eavesdrop. The bill was revised in response to these objections. See supra
notes 82-83, 98-100 and accompanying text.
103. See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809.
104. See, e.g., Schrimsher, 493 F.2d at 850-51 (statute inapplicable because the disa-
greement does not extend beyond the marital home of the parties and no third parties are
involved); Perfit, 693 F. Supp. at 855-56 (an "interspousal domestic conflict"); London v.
London, 420 F. Supp. 944, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (in holding no liability under the statute,
the court stated that "[w]hat is important is that the locus in quo of the interception be a
family home which the husband shares with some family member whose conversations
are recorded").
105. For an analogy in a business context, see United States v. Christman, 375 F.
Supp. 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
106. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974). The court referred to the "very intimate question of familial relations" and the
"extent of privacy family members [have] vis-a-vis each other." Id.
107. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson, 490
F.2d at 809 & n.17.
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privacy as to one another. "I Even during marital discord, a married
individual sharing a residence with his spouse will have less privacy
merely because of the presence of the other spouse. 109 A lower expecta-
tion of privacy is consonant with the general proximity of spouses and
other family members within the marital home. While this proximity
does not give a married individual an unfettered right to intercept his
spouse's communications, the unique nature of the marital relationship
and the resulting lowered expectation of privacy takes it beyond the pur-
view of the statute."10
The statute itself limits prohibited surveillance of oral communications
to those instances where the oral communication is made by a person
"exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to in-
terception under circumstances justifying such expectation.""' How-
ever, this expectation requirement is limited to oral communications, and
does not extend to electronic communications such as telephone
interception." 2
Logically, the same expectation of privacy requirement should apply
to interspousal telephone surveillance. The telephone conversation com-
monly takes place in the marital home. This location increases the likeli-
hood that the other spouse will overhear the conversation unless
precautions are taken.
Courts have read the telephone extension exception as an indication of
congressional intent not to determine the extent of privacy family mem-
bers may expect between one another within the home." 3 Congress rec-
ognized that the inevitable marital or other family dispute was generally
too private a matter to be prohibited by federal law.114
In summary, the legislative history offers inconclusive evidence on
congressional intent regarding interspousal surveillance. Even when read
108. See Baumrind v. Ewing, 276 S.C. 350, 353, 279 S.E.2d 359, 360, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981). The couple shared a home at the time of the interspousal surveillance.
The court stated that "the expectations of privacy of both [the wife] and [the third party]
should reasonably be more restricted in conversations which could easily be overheard
within the marital home. Had the Baumrinds been living separate and apart, the conver-
sants' expectations of privacy would be greater." Id.; see also Right of Privacy Act of
1967 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the Senate Judi-
ciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 395 (1967) (father/daughter extension telephone sur-
veillance was not intended to be prohibited).
109. Even spouses who are not communicating cannot avoid each other if they are
sharing a residence.
110. See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809; Baumrind, 276 S.C. at 353, 279 S.E.2d at 360.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Oral communication is defined as
"any oral communication uttered by a person." Id.
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp.
463, 473 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Fishman, The Interception of Communications Without a Court
Order: Title III, Consent and the Expectation of Privacy, 51 St. John's L. Rev. 41, 61-66
(1976).
113. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974).
114. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977).
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most broadly, the legislative history provides questionable support for
the application of Title III to interspousal surveillance. This insubstan-
tial support is insufficient to overcome the strong presumption created by
the domestic relations doctrine that domestic disputes are matters for
state law determination. 115
III. STATE'S ROLE IN ADJUDICATING DOMESTIC DISPUTES
Among the most persuasive arguments for declining to apply Title III
to interspousal surveillance is the domestic relations doctrine. The do-
mestic relations doctrine provides that the state courts are the appropri-
ate forum for interspousal litigation.116
Marriage, divorce and family law have historically been within the ex-
clusive province of the state.1 17 Over 100 years ago, the Supreme Court
declined to exercise jurisdiction over divorce and alimony proceedings. 118
This self-imposed limitation on federal court power was extended to do-
mestic relations cases generally. 1 9
The exclusive role of the states in regulating the area of domestic rela-
115. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
116. Some state courts discourage marital litigation through the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity, a state doctrine which bars interspousal tort claims. See AIfree v.
Alfree, 410 A.2d 161 (Del. 1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1980); Hill v. Hill, 415
So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1982); Peters v. Peters, 63 Haw. 653, 634 P.2d 586 (1981); Bonkowsky v.
Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 431 N.E.2d 998, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982).
Nevertheless, the doctrine appears to be a dying one. For a list of states which have
abrogated the doctrine, see H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United
States § 10.1, at 372 (2d ed. 1988).
Because interspousal immunity cannot bar the appropriate application of a federal stat-
ute, the doctrine is not a basis for declining to apply Title III to interspousal surveillance.
Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F.
Supp. 463, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
117. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-4 (1890) (domestic relations exception to
federal diversity jurisdiction in the area of custody of minors and visitation rights because
domestic relations are a matter of state, not federal, law).
118. See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (the Court "disclaim[ed]
altogther any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce,
or for the allowance of alimony"). In Barber, a former husband left the state to avoid
state court attempts to enforce his alimony obligation. While the Supreme Court dis-
claimed any general jurisdiction over divorce proceedings, the Court held that a wife may
sue in equity in federal court to enforce the alimony obligation. Id. at 599-600.
119. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94; Gullo v. Hirst, 332 F.2d 178, 179 (4th Cir.
1964); Delavigne v. Delavigne, 402 F. Supp 363, 366 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 598
(4th Cir. 1976); see also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977)
(referring to the instant surveillance as a "purely domestic conflict ... a matter clearly to
be handled by the state courts"); Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529, 532-33 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) ("The Act is a far reaching one which, if read to cover circumstances such as that
presented by the instant case, would have serious ramifications as to the degree of federal
control over actions by family members within their own homes."). For examples of
decisions declining federal jurisdiction in child custody cases, see Garga~lo v. Gargallo,
472 F.2d 1219, 1220 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 805 (1973); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt,
373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967).
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tions underscores the state interest in family matters.12° This state inter-
est is exemplified in Supreme Court recognition of a state right to
regulate marriage and divorce.1 21
One reason underlying the domestic relations exception is the special
competence that state courts have in interpreting their own complex and
individualized marriage, divorce and other domestic relations laws. 122
Although the application of Title III to interspousal surveillance impli-
cates only interpretation of the federal statute and not the individualized
state domestic relations laws, such surveillance becomes a domestic rela-
tions issue precisely because it involves a dispute over the relationship
between the spouses. Both the Fifth and Second Circuits have adopted
this view. 123
Thus, a federal remedy under Title III would intrude upon an area of
law historically governed by the states.124 Because of this special state
interest in adjudicating domestic disputes, some courts have concluded
that federal law was not intended to apply to interspousal surveillance. 125
As a result of their traditional role, state courts have developed a profi-
ciency and expertise in the area that cannot be matched in the federal
courts. 126 While competent in the application and interpretation of fed-
eral statutes, the federal courts have limited experience in the area of
120. See Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977) (stating that "this rule
respects the special interests of the states in domestic relations matters").
121. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled on other grounds, International
Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme Court declared "[t]he
State... has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation
between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved."
Id. at 734-35; accord Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899). More recently, the
Supreme Court has held that a state may restrict a married couple's ability to obtain a
divorce by attaching a residency requirement. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409
(1975). The requirement "additionally furthers the State's parallel interests both in
avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in which another State has a paramount inter-
est, and in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collateral attack."
Id. at 407.
122. See Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 515 (2d
Cir. 1973) (while federal district court jurisdiction was not plain error, "decision requires
exploration of a difficult field of New York law with which, because of its proximity to
the exception for matrimonial actions, federal judges are more than ordinarily unfamil-
iar"); see also Note, Application of Federal Abstention Doctrines to the Domestic Relations
Exception to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 5 Duke L.J. 1095, 1099 (1983) (state compe-
tence and expertise, the need for ongoing supervision of divorce and alimony decrees, and
the possibility of incompatible state and federal decrees make federal court abstention
appropriate in domestic relations cases).
123. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974) (Title III's application to interspousal surveillance would reach into areas of law
normally left to the states); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 669 (2d Cir. 1973)
(interspousal surveillance is "purely a domestic conflict").
124. For a discussion of the history and present application of the domestic relations
doctrine, see Cherry, 438 F. Supp. at 89-90.
125. See Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851, 855-56 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Lizza v. Lizza, 631
F. Supp. 529, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
126. See Nouse v. Nouse, 450 F. Supp. 97, 103 (D. Md. 1978); Cherry v. Cherry, 438
F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977).
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domestic law, risking protracted litigation and administrative delays. 127
The domestic relations doctrine creates a heavy presumption in favor
of exclusive state regulation and adjudication of interspousal surveillance
and other domestic issues. Because interspousal surveillance arises from
a domestic dispute, courts have determined that federal law is an inap-
propriate means of prohibiting the action. 128
CONCLUSION
Title III should not be applied to interspousal surveillance. The his-
torical and practical underpinnings of the domestic relations doctrine
create a strong presumption that state law governs interspousal surveil-
lance to the exclusion of Title III. Only a positive expression of congres-
sional intent to apply Title III to interspousal surveillance can overcome
this heavy presumption that federal law should not apply to a domestic
conflict. Given the inconclusive legislative history and the absence of an
express indication of congressional intent to apply Title III between
spouses, Title III should not be read to provide a federal remedy for
interspousal surveillance.
Cori . Stephens
127. See Cherry, 438 F. Supp. at 90; see also Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon
v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973) ("we do not believe that the Supreme
Court today would demand that federal judges waste their time exploring a thicket of
state decisional law") (footnote omitted).
128. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977); Robinson v.
Robinson, 499 So. 2d 152, 155 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
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